DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES, RECYCLING & RECOVERY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF:

Recycling Specialists, Inc - Norman An

Address: 1720 Old Bayshore Highway, San Jose, California

Type of Entity: Application Denial

File No.: IH17-007-BCR

Certificate No.: CN509548

PRECEDENTIAL DECISION No.: 23-16

Designation of decision as precedential under Government Code Section 11425.60

Pursuant to Government Code Section 11425.60, the Department of Resources, Recycling and Recovery hereby designates as precedential its decision, dated July 20, 2017, in the above-referenced action.

This decision is designated precedential effective September 10, 2023,

Sacramento, California.

Dated: September 10, 2023.

As approved by Rachel Machi Wagoner on September 10, 2023,

Department of Resources, Recycling & Recovery.

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY

IN THE MATTER OF:)	File No. IH17-007-BCR
RECYCLING SPECIALISTS, INC., CN509548; NORMAN AN,)	DECISION AND ORDER
RESPONDENT.)))	
)	

I. INTRODUCTION

The Division of Recycling ("Division" or "DOR") of the Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery ("CalRecycle" or "Department") issued a notice to Recycling Specialists, Inc. ("Respondent" or "RSI") dated April 25, 2017, denying Respondent's application for certification to operate a processing facility at 1720 Old Bayshore Highway in San Jose, California.

Respondent filed a timely request for a hearing on the application denial pursuant to Title 14, section 2130 of the California Code of Regulations.

A hearing was conducted on July 10, 2017, in Sacramento, California. On that date all evidence and testimony in this matter was received into the record. The hearing was transcribed by a court reporter.

Benjamin Grimes, Attorney, CalRecycle, appeared on behalf of the Division. Elizabeth M. Pappy, Esq., appeared on behalf of Respondent.

Douglas C. Jensen, Attorney III, CalRecycle, presided over the hearing under a delegation of authority from CalRecycle Director, Scott Smithline.

II. ISSUE

Whether the Division's decision to deny Respondent's application for certification to operate a processing facility shall be sustained, modified, or reversed.

III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

The Division presented testimony from Jennifer Akins ("Akins"). Akins has been a certification supervisor for the Division since July of 2014. As part of her job duties, she reviews applications for recycling and processor certifications as well as her staff's recommendations regarding certification applications. Ms. Akins testified generally as

to the application review process and specifically as to her review of Respondent's certification application.

Respondent presented testimony from Howard Misle ("Misle"), the majority owner of RSI. Misle began working in the recycling business in approximately 1994, and since that time has been associated with several businesses involved in various recycling activities. Those businesses include American Metal & Iron, Inc. ("AMI"), American Metal Group, Inc. ("AMG"), Antique and Salvage Liquidators, Inc. ("ASL"), and AMI Southern California, Inc. ("AMISC"). Misle testified generally as to his business experience in the recycling field, and provided specific testimony regarding an approximate 2001 Division audit of AMI, a lawsuit filed by ASL and AMISC against the Department, and criminal guilty pleas entered by AMG and ASL in 2012.

Respondent also presented testimony from Dora Zuniga ("Zuniga"). Zuniga is employed by RSI as an office manager and her duties include completing shipping reports in DORIIS¹. Ms. Zuniga testified regarding her previous experience working in the recycling field, including AMI and AMG-- both owned by Misle.

Division Exhibits 3, 5 through 12, and 14 through 18, were admitted into evidence without objection.

Division Exhibit 4-- a 2012 criminal complaint, investigation report, and plea documents—were admitted over Respondent's hearsay objection. However, for purposes of this Decision and Order, consideration of Division Exhibit 4 has been limited to the criminal complaint and the plea documents, both of which were acknowledged and addressed by Misle in his testimony and were not disputed.

Respondent Exhibits A and B were admitted into evidence without objection.

On the day of hearing, Respondent submitted an informal hearing brief that included legal arguments either not raised or not substantially addressed at hearing. The Division was afforded an opportunity to respond to the brief with the limitation that any response be limited to the legal issues raised in Respondent's brief. The Division filed and served a responsive brief on July 13, 2017.

On July 14, 2017, Respondent filed objections to the Division's responsive brief on the basis that it exceeded the scope of the Hearing Officer's instruction that any responsive brief be limited to the legal arguments raised in Respondent's brief. Respondent moved to strike arguments outside the scope of the Hearing Officer's instruction. The Division filed a response to the objections and motion to strike on July 17, 2017.

The Division's responsive brief does repeat some arguments presented at hearing. However, the repeated arguments provide context for the Division's substantive response to legal arguments raised in Respondent's brief. The Division's responsive brief does not raise new arguments outside the scope of the Hearing Officer's

¹ DORIIS stands for Division of Recycling Integrated Information System. It is the program utilized by the Division and its certificate-holders to record California Refund Value transactions.

instruction. Therefore, Respondent's objections are overruled and its motion to strike is denied.

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

On April 25, 2017, the Division issued a letter to Respondent indicating that its application to operate as a certified processor at 1720 Old Bayshore Highway in San Jose had been denied. The denial letter noted that three people responsible for Respondent's proposed processing facility had previous experience in the Beverage Container Recycling Program: Howard Misle, John Velasquez, and Dora Zuniga. These three individuals were associated with AMI, which had been certified as both a recycling center and a processor at 11665 Berryessa Road in San Jose. They were also associated with AMG, another certified processor and recycler also operating out of 11665 Berryessa Road.

The denial letter indicated that AMI had been the subject of a 2001 Division audit ("Audit") resulting in a finding of a \$1,505,505.22 liability from improper payments. The letter noted that while a settlement had been reached with AMI for the overpayments, AMI eventually defaulted on the agreement.

The denial letter further noted two Misle-owned corporations, AMG and ASL, had pleaded guilty to multiple felonies. The letter indicated that the 2001 Division audit of AMI, the subsequent default on the audit settlement, and the felony guilty pleas formed the basis for the denial.

John Velasquez ("Velasquez"), identified as a responsible individual in the Division's denial letter, is employed as yard manager at RSI responsible for day-to-day operations. He was previously employed at AMI and AMG in a similar capacity, and was the yard manager at AMI from November 1, 1999 through October 31, 2001-- the review period of the Audit.

Dora Zuniga ("Zuniga"), also identified as a responsible individual in the Division's denial letter, is employed by RSI as an office manager, and her duties include filling out shipping reports and processor invoices, and entering information into DORIIS. Zuniga was previously employed at AMG and AMI in a similar capacity to her current position. During at least some of the Audit period, Zuniga was responsible for verifying California Refund Value transactions at AMI. She recently obtained a Division voucher, qualifying her to apply for certifications.

Misle is the majority owner of RSI, which he purchased in approximately July of 2016. At the time of purchase, RSI held a recycling center certification.

Misle has extensive experience in the recycling field. He first worked in recycling beginning in 1994 at his father-in-law's company, City Metals. In 1999, Misle purchased his father-in-law's company, and it became AMI.

The Division conducted an audit ("Audit") on AMI for the period of November 1, 1999 through October 31, 2001. The Audit found that AMI failed to submit accurate shipping reports and processor invoices, failed to satisfy receipting requirements, and failed to report all aluminum beverage container transactions greater than 250 pounds. It found overpayments to AMI exceeding 1.4 million dollars.

Misle testified that the overpayments occurred as a result of an employee theft. The employee stole large amounts of copper from AMI and attempted to cover the theft by manipulating AMI's records to create fraudulent aluminum and plastic California Refund Value ("CRV") transactions. Misle testified that he filed a criminal report in connection with the theft and hired a private investigator to track down the employee. Misle looked into pursuing legal action against the employee, but decided it would not be worthwhile because the employee could not be found.

In approximately December of 2002, AMI and the Division entered into Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Final Agency Decision ("Stipulation") in connection with the Audit findings. The Stipulation required AMI to pay the Division \$1,498,705 in CRV, Administrative fees, Processing Payments, interest, and any delinquent penalties according to a set schedule.

In approximately 2009, AMI lost its main line of credit which led Misle to "re-establish" AMI as a new Misle-owned company, AMG. AMG retained the same employees as AMI and continued with the same type of business.

On September 10, 2009, two Misle-owned companies, ASL and AMISC, filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Injunctive Relief and Complaint for Inverse Condemnation and Unfair Competition ("E-Waste Lawsuit") against the California Integrated Waste Management Board². The Lawsuit alleged damages exceeding \$10 million in connection with the failure to make E-waste payments.

Eventually, AMI stopped making payments to the Division as required by the Stipulation. Misle testified that the State owed him money and he had therefore filed the E-Waste Lawsuit. Since the State had not made E-waste payments to Misle, he would not make payments to the State as required by the Stipulation.

Subsequent to ASI's default on the Stipulation payments, on approximately November 8, 2010, the Division filed with the Superior Court of Sacramento an Application for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Public Resources Code Section 14591.5 ("Application"). The Application resulted in Judgment and Order ("Judgment") adjudging that the Division recover against AMI the amount of \$970,632.00—the outstanding amount on the Stipulation and related late penalties and interest.

In approximately April of 2011, Misle sold AMI and AMG to an entity named Schnitzer Steel ("Schnitzer"). Schnitzer applied to the Division for certifications for its recycling operations. The certifications were granted with the condition that Misle not be involved

² The California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery was established in 2010 to replace the California Integrated Waste Management Board.

in the operation of the facilities. Zuniga stayed on with Schnitzer after the sale and continued with her same work duties. Velasquez also stayed on with Schnitzer for a short time in his capacity as yard manager.

On January 19, 2012, a First Amended Felony Complaint ("Complaint") was filed against Misle, Velasquez, AMG, ASL, and others. Subsequently, AMG pleaded guilty to false or fraudulent statement to discourage workers from claiming benefits or pursuing a claim, false or fraudulent statement for purpose of reducing premium, rate or cost of workers' compensation insurance, and willful failure to collect, truthfully account for and pay tax. ASL pleaded guilty to false or fraudulent statement for purpose of reducing premium, rate or cost of worker's compensation insurance and willful failure to collect, truthfully account for and pay tax. The criminal complaint was resolved with AMG's and ASL's guilty pleas, and no further actions were taken against Misle or Velasquez.

Misle testified that he caused AMG and ASL to plead guilty as a "business decision". He felt that the accusations in the Complaint were meritless, but he caused the companies to plead guilty to save the cost of taking the criminal matter to trial and to resolve any liability for the individuals named.

In approximately September of 2012, ASL, AMISC, AMI, AMG, and the Department entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release ("Settlement"). The Settlement resolved a number of legal actions between the parties including the Department's enforcement of the Judgment and the E-Waste Lawsuit. The Misle-owned companies agreed to pay CalRecycle \$75,000.00, and the Department agreed to transfer \$700,000.00 from the Electronic Waste and Recovery and Recycling Account to the Beverage Container Recycling Fund. Misle testified that prior to resolution of the E-Waste Lawsuit, the State paid over \$1 million to the Misle-owned companies at the urging of the settlement judge.

V. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

The Division is charged with enforcing the California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act (Public Resources Code section 14500 et. seq.) ("Act") and related regulations found at Title 14, California Code of Regulations, section 2000 et seq. ("Regulations"). The Division is further charged with the duty of protecting the integrity of the California Beverage Container Recycling Fund ("Fund"). (Pub. Res. Code § 14552.)

Section 14539(a)(1) of the Act requires a processor to demonstrate to the Division's satisfaction that it will operate in accordance with the Act. This burden of demonstrating compliance with the Act applies to applicants for certification.³

³ Absent a statute or other authority fixing a different standard, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Evidence Code section 115.) Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting. (Evid. Code § 500.) Therefore, applicants for certification must meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 2030(e) of the Regulations requires that, in determining whether an applicant is likely to operate in accordance with the Regulations, the Division review the certification history of the operator and any other responsible individuals.

Here, the certification history of RSI's majority-owner, Howard Misle, is significant. The 2001 Audit of ASI, a Misle-owned company, found overpayments in excess of \$1.4 million—the result of fraudulent aluminum and plastic CRV transactions. Misle acknowledged the overpayments and entered into a legal agreement to make restitution, but his company then defaulted.

Misle testified that he caused the default because the Department owed him money for outstanding E-Waste payments. His businesses had filed a lawsuit against the Department (E-Waste Lawsuit) for the outstanding payments and that litigation was pending at the time of the default.

Ultimately, Misle's E-Waste Lawsuit and the Department's action to enforce the Judgment were settled. The conditions of the Settlement and Misle's testimony that the Department made substantial payments to Misle's companies during the pendency of the E-Waste Lawsuit suggest that the E-Waste Lawsuit had at least some merit.

However, even if the Department owed money to Misle's businesses, that does not excuse Misle's decision to default on the Stipulation. He entered into a valid and binding legal agreement and then intentionally broke it. Misle's default demonstrates a disregard for the law and a willingness to forego his promises.

Respondent argues that the Department is barred from relying upon the Audit or any action it had to take to collect on the Judgment because it settled its claim and dismissed it with prejudice. Respondent cites to a 1968 Appeals Court case in support of its position:

"A judgment or order of a court of general jurisdiction cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding unless the judgment or order be void. [Citations omitted] Reasonably, this rule must be applied to a dismissal of an action 'with prejudice', particularly when it was made and entered for a consideration. [Citations omitted]" Wouldridge v. Burns (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 85—86.

Wouldridge is inapposite. The Division is not attacking a judgment or order of the court in a collateral proceeding. Rather, it is responding to a certification application submitted by a non-party to the settlement. The settlement includes no language that would preclude the Division from considering AMI's and AMG's conduct in the review of a third-party application for certification.

Furthermore, interpreting the Settlement as barring the Division's ability to perform its mandatory duties under the Act and Regulations is void as against public policy. The Division's duties further the public policies of encouraging and promoting recycling and protecting the Fund. The courts have made clear that when public policy outweighs the

interest in enforcement of a contract term, policy will prevail. (*Careveau v. Halferty* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 126, 132.) Here, the public policy interests served by the Division's thorough and mandatory review of an applicant's certification history clearly outweigh a dismissal and a general release to which the applicant was not a party.

Nonetheless, the Audit and subsequent Settlement default are not the only factors that weigh in favor of Respondent's application denial. Two of Misle's companies—ASL and AMG-- pleaded guilty to false or fraudulent statement for purpose of reducing premium, rate or cost of worker's compensation insurance and willful failure to collect, truthfully account for and pay tax.

Section 14591.2 of the Act provides that the Division can revoke a certificate when a responsible party is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude or fraud, any crime involving dishonesty, or any crime substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a certificate holder. (Pub. Res. Code § 14591.2(b)(4).) The crimes here are, by their plain terms, crimes of fraud. Since such crimes may form the basis for certificate revocation, it follows that they may also form the basis of application denial.

Respondent argues that for a crime to form a basis for discipline, there must be a logical connection between the crime and the licensee's fitness to practice the profession. (*Hughes v. Board of Architectural Exam'rs* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 788.). However, the Division is not disciplining Respondent, but merely denying an application for certification. A certification is not a license, and it is not a vested right or interest. A certification is a privilege. (Pub. Res. Code § 14541.5). Even if the Division was imposing discipline on a licensee, there is a logical nexus here. Misle's companies pleaded guilty to crimes of fraud. The Act specifically instructs the Division to consider such crimes when reviewing applications for certification. (Pub. Res. Code § 14591.2(b)(4).). Respondent's argument is without merit.

Misle testified that he caused AMG and ASL to plead guilty to crimes of fraud as a "business decision". He did not believe the Complaint had merit, but he pleaded guilty to avoid the costs of continued litigation. However, Misle pleaded guilty with the guidance of legal counsel and should have known that he was admitting that the crimes occurred. His disavowal of the guilty pleas now is not credible.

The Audit, subsequent default, and guilty pleas constitute an adequate and reasonable basis for denial of Respondent's certification application. However, Respondent argues that stated bases for denial are merely pretext. The true reason that Respodent has been denied certification is because the Division is "bitter that it had to pay Mr. Misle's companies thousands and thousands of dollars as a result of the [E-Waste Lawsuit]."

However, Respondent has provided no evidence of the Division's alleged bitterness. Akins was responsible for denying Respondent's application and she testified that the bases for the denial were the Audit, default, and guilty pleas. There is no evidence that she was personally involved in the E-Waste Lawsuit or instructed by those involved to recommend denial. There is no evidence that Akins harbored any personal animus against Mr. Misle or against his many companies or that she deviated in any way from

the Division's statutory duties in reviewing Respondent's application. Akins testimony was, at all times, credible.

Respondent characterizes the E-Waste Lawsuit Settlement as favorable to the Misleowned companies and unfavorable to the Division. However, this conclusion is not necessarily supported by the terms of the Settlement. And the mere fact that there was litigation between the Misle-owned companies and the Division cannot support an inference of animus. Indeed, the fact that the litigation settled and did not proceed to trial and verdict suggests that the parties to the Settlement were satisfied with its terms.

Respondent points to the fact that its recycling certification was left in place at the time it was purchased by Misle, while its subsequent application for a processor certification was denied, as evidence of inconsistency. However, the Division is not time-barred from taking a future enforcement action against Respondent's recycling certification. (Pub. Res. Code § 14552(b)(2).) Even if the Division does not take any action against Respondent's recycling certificate, its position is not necessarily inconsistent.⁴ The legal standards for disciplinary action against a certificate holder are significantly different than those the Division must apply when granting or denying an application for certification. (Pub. Res. Code § 14591—14597, 14538(b)(1), 14539(b)(1); 14 Cal. Code Regs. § 2030.) A certification history that warrants an application denial may not necessarily warrant a certification revocation.

Respondent further argues in its brief that "CalRecycle offers no explanation as to why it continues to allow RSI to operate as a Recycler when recyclers have a substantially higher risk of noncompliance." As noted above, the Department is not time-barred from taking a future action against RSI's recycling certification. Moreover, there is no evidence to support to the notion that recyclers present a higher risk of noncompliance than processors.

Respondent points to the fact that Misle was prohibited from involvement in the recycling operations of Schnitzer as a condition of its certification, but Zuniga and Velasquez were not, as further evidence of inconsistency on the part of the Division. It is not clear why Zuniga and Velasquez were not prohibited from involvement at Schnitzer, as they were both responsible parties during the period covered by the Audit. However, there is no evidence suggesting that Zuniga and Velasquez were responsible for AMI's default on the Stipulation. Misle, on the other hand, was directly responsible for the default. Therefore, Misle's position at the time the prohibition was implemented was distinct from Velasquez and Zuniga. The mere fact that the prohibition did not extend to Zuniga and Velasquez is not evidence of Divsion inconsistency.

Respondent argues that the fact that Zuniga was granted a voucher although she was a responsible party at the time of the Audit is further evidence of Division inconsistency. However, Zuniga admitted that a voucher merely allows her to *apply* for certification—it is not a certification approval. Obtaining a voucher does not involve any approval or recommendation on the part of the Division. Rather, a voucher is provided when a

⁴ Akins testified that she did in fact recommend that Respondent's recycling certification be revoked, but that the Division decided not to act on that recommendation.

passing score on an examination is obtained. The fact that Zuniga secured a voucher is not evidence of inconsistency on the part of the Division.

Respondent has not met its burden of demonstrating that it will comply with the Act and Regulations. A certificate to operate a processing facility is a privilege, not a right. (Pub. Res. Code § 14541.5.) In determining whether this privilege will be granted to an applicant, the Division has broad discretion. The Audit, subsequent default, and guilty pleas constitute good cause to deny Respondent's application for certification.

VI. DECISION AND ORDER

The Division's decision to deny Respondent's application for certification to run a processing facility is sustained.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: 7/20/17

HEARING OFFICER

Douglas C. Jensen

Attorney III

Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle)



DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Donnet J. McFarlane, declare as follows:

I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My place of employment and business is as in the letterhead.

On July 21st, 2017, I served the attached for entitled action:

The Decision & Order in The Matter of Recycling Specialist Inc., CalRecycle Case No. IH17-007-BCR to:

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Ву:	
	First Class Mail - In a sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States.
	Certified Mail - In a sealed envelope, return receipt requested with Postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail.
X_	Electronic Service - Sent to the email addresses listed above.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed at Sacramento, California, on the 21st day of July 2017.

(Signature)